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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, one journalist, Dirk Lammers, undertook a seemingly
innocuous task: to avoid anything “Made in China” for just one
1
week. He was not the first to undertake such a challenge in
consumerism. Others before him declared a boycott on Chinese
2
products for an entire year, acting either out of concern for safety
regarding allegations of Chinese food contamination and faulty
3
assembly-line production of tires and toys, or simply reacting to the
4
realization that everything they owned—or close to it—was Chinese.
Lammers wanted to see if a boycott on Chinese goods was even
feasible—whether an American consumer who wanted to buy strictly
5
American products could succeed. In a word, the answer was no.
6
Lammers, like those before him, failed. Sneakers, tennis rackets,
toothpaste, and obscure ingredients in most food staples are all
7
“Made in China.” This ubiquitous phrase is here to stay and will
continue to represent a formidable competitor in the American
market because it signals products that are cheaper and virtually
indistinguishable from their American or European prototypes.
The results of Lammers’ experiment reflect the larger economic
reality that the United States has increased its imports from China
8
more than two hundred percent since 2001. Federal courts have
responded to this changing dynamic in the area of trade secrets with
jurisprudence that carries serious implications regarding
extraterritorial jurisdiction and international trade law. Facts in cases
involving trade secret misappropriation are generally similar:
1. Dirk Lammers, What to Do When Everything is ‘Made in China?’ A One-Week
Attempt to Avoid Products From There Meets With Little Success, MSNBC (June 29, 2007,
6:26 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19508453/ns/business-world_business
/t/what-do-when-everything-made-china/#.Twtk7G_Lyzk.
2. See, e.g., SARA BONGIORNI, A YEAR WITHOUT “MADE IN CHINA”: ONE FAMILY’S
TRUE LIFE ADVENTURE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1 (2007).
3. Eve Tahmincioglu, One Mom’s Fruitless Quest to Boycott China: Reporter Struggles
in Attempt to Protect Family from Unsafe Products, MSNBC (Nov. 21, 2007, 5:40 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21825517/ns/business-holiday_retail/t/one-momsfruitless-quest-boycott-china/.
4. BONGIORNI, supra note 2, at 3, 5 (explaining late one night she attempted to
“kick China out,” but instead she opted not to bring any more Chinese products into
her home because to remove China from her house would have left her house
barren).
5. Lammers, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See U.S.-China Trade Secret Statistics and China’s World Trade Statistics, US-CHINA
BUS. COUNCIL, https://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html (last visited Mar.
2, 2012) (providing the yearly change in U.S. imports from China from 2001 to
2010).

ECONOMIDES.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/14/2012 6:46 PM

THE DUBIOUS STATUS OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY

1237

inventor-company develops a new process for the production of
widgets, and then competitor-company hires away inventor9
company’s employees and steals the process. The question in these
cases usually turns on whether all the elements of a trade secret cause
10
of action are met, and jurisdictional issues are rarely determinative.
The facts are more complicated, however, when the competitorcompany is a foreign corporation, and the misappropriation occurs
entirely abroad. In a recent case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit grappled with this very issue. In TianRui
11
Group Co. v. International Trade Commission, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the International Trade Commission’s authority under
12
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to investigate conduct that
allegedly amounted to unlawful misappropriation of trade secrets
13
that occurred entirely in China. This decision complicates Supreme
Court precedent on the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction and
stretches a key element of a section 337 case beyond reasonable
limits.
This Note asserts that the Federal Circuit inappropriately
expanded its jurisdiction in TianRui for two main reasons. First, an
established presumption that U.S. laws do not apply extraterritorially
should have prevented jurisdiction because the conduct in this case
14
occurred entirely outside of the United States. Second, section 337
requires that the unfair act threaten to destroy or substantially injure
15
an industry in the United States. The actions in TianRui cannot
satisfy this requirement because there can be no domestic industry
where a United States inventor no longer employs the
misappropriated process in its production of widgets.
9. See, e.g., Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir.
2010) (involving an employee from Bimbo Bakeries with special knowledge
regarding English muffins leaving to join Hostess Brands); PepsiCo, Inc. v.
Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1264 (7th Cir. 1995) (involving an employee from Pepsi
being solicited by a competitor for a job involving pricing and strategic planning of
sports drinks).
10. Bimbo Bakeries, 613 F.3d at 109 (listing the elements of a trade secret cause of
action under the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act); PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1267–
68 (listing the elements of a trade secret cause of action under the Illinois Trade
Secrets Act).
11. 661 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).
13. TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1324.
14. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883, 2888 (2010)
(concluding that securities violations occurring in a foreign jurisdiction were not
sufficient to support federal jurisdiction); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S.
437, 441–42 (2007) (holding that patent infringement occurring entirely abroad was
not within the scope of the statute under which the action was challenged because
the conduct occurred abroad).
15. Tariff Act of 1930 § 337(a)(1)(A).
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Part I of this Note will provide background about the elements of a
trade secret claim and a section 337 cause of action. Part I will then
introduce TianRui and provide a description of the facts of the case,
its procedural posture, and the major holdings of the Federal Circuit.
Part II of this Note will critique the Federal Circuit’s reasoning and
argue that TianRui was incorrectly decided because it contradicted
Supreme Court precedent regarding extraterritoriality and
compromised the domestic industry requirement of a section 337
claim under the Tariff Act of 1930.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Elements of a Trade Secret and of a Section 337 Case
In general, there are two approaches to determining whether a
plaintiff possesses a trade secret. Most states ascribe to the Uniform
Trade Secret Act (UTSA), which defines a trade secret as:
information . . . [that] derives independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and . . . is the
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
16
maintain its secrecy.

Thus, under the UTSA, a plaintiff must show four elements: (1)
that it has a secret; (2) that the secret has commercial value; (3) that
the plaintiff has taken reasonable precautions to protect the secret;
and (4) that the defendant acquired the secret through improper
17
means.
18
Several states, however, have not adopted the UTSA and instead
19
look to the Restatement of Torts for the definition of a trade secret.
According to the Restatement, a trade secret is “any formula, pattern,
[or] device” which is “secret” such that it is not a “[matter] of public
knowledge,” and where, “except by the use of improper means, there

16. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
17. See also Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1202 (5th
Cir. 1986) (explaining that “‘a trade secret can exist in a combination of
characteristics and components each of which, by itself, is in the public domain, but
the unified process, design and operation of which in unique combination, afford a
competitive advantage and is a protectible [sic] secret’” (quoting Imperial Chem.
Indus. Ltd. v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 342 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1965))).
18. Notably, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, and Texas have not
enacted statutes modeled after the UTSA. Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act (last visited Mar. 2,
2012).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (1995).
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20

would be difficulty in acquiring the information.”
While the
definition largely mirrors the definition in the UTSA, the Restatement
does not delineate strict elements that must be met but rather
depends on the totality of the circumstances, including a
consideration of six factors:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of [the
plaintiff’s] business; (2) the extent to which it is known by
employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of
measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4)
the value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the
amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the
information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the
21
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.

A particularly strong showing of one factor can make up for a weak
22
showing of another. Furthermore, both of these definitions carry
the implicit requirement that a trade secret have some modicum of
23
originality.
Alternatively, the plaintiff may bring its claim under section 337 of
the Tariff Act of 1930, which some commentators have described as a
quicker and more effective means of protecting a trade secret than
24
pursuing a remedy in the courts. Section 337(a) prohibits “[u]nfair
methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of
articles . . . into the United States . . . the threat or effect of which
is . . . to destroy or substantially injure an industry in the United

20. Id. Acquisition of a trade secret through the intentional hiring-away of
employees of a company may also amount to improper means—notwithstanding the
lack of a formal confidentiality agreement—if the court finds that the employee was
bound by an implied duty of confidentiality given the nature of his work and his
position within the company. See, e.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v.
Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (regarding instances of limited disclosure, the
recipient of secret information implicitly agrees not to “fraudulently abuse the trust
reposed in him”); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 376 (7th Cir. 1953)
(discussing the presence of an implied duty of confidentiality notwithstanding the
lack of an express agreement).
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (1995).
22. See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 177–78,
180 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that summary judgment was inappropriate where
plaintiff’s action of disclosing confidential trade information was necessary to utilize
that information and that a determination of the reasonableness of the disclosures in
light of the industry at issue was needed).
23. See Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
plaintiff cannot claim its relatively straightforward recipes for BBQ chicken and
macaroni and cheese as trade secrets).
24. See Gary M. Hnath, Section 337 Investigations at the U.S. International Trade
Commission: A Powerful Weapon Toy Companies Can Use to Block Unfair Imports, THE TOY
BOOK, May/June 2010, at 84, 86 (estimating that section 337 investigations are
usually completed in twelve to sixteen months).
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25

States.”
The statute operates under the auspices of the
International Trade Commission (ITC) and is used primarily to
26
prevent importations involving patent infringement. The language
of section 337 is broad, however, and can be used to prevent
27
importations that involve other unfair acts.
For ITC cases involving statutory intellectual property (patents,
trademarks, and copyrights), a complainant must show: (1) that the
28
product in question has been imported into the United States; (2)
that importation constitutes “infringement” under the relevant
29
30
statutory definition; and (3) that a domestic industry exists.
Complainants alleging infringement of non-statutory intellectual
property (IP), such as trade secrets, have to prove an additional
element: that the respondent’s acts caused or threatened to cause
31
injury to the domestic industry.
The domestic industry element historically limited the availability
of trade law protection to companies who manufactured their
32
patented products in the United States. There are two prongs of the
domestic industry requirement: the “economic” prong and the
33
“technical” prong.
The economic prong examines the type of
25. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2006).
26. See Gary M. Hnath, Section 337 Investigations at the US International Trade
Commission Provide A Powerful Remedy Against Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L.J., June 2010 at 1, 1 (estimating that ninety percent of section 337
cases involve patent infringement).
27. See id. at 5 (explaining the ITC’s ability to fashion remedies is broad so as to
prevent respondents from designing around an exclusion order).
28. The importation requirement is quite broad and includes any activity that
amounts to movement of a product across borders. See, e.g., Certain Welded Stainless
Steel Pipe & Tube, Inv. No. 337-TA-29, USITC Pub. 863, at 11 (Feb. 1978)
(Commission Determination and Action) (stating that the importation requirement
is not limited to actual importation but includes ancillary acts “in the sale by an
owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either”).
29. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)–(E); see also Hnath, supra note 26, at 1–2
(discussing the choice of law issues that commonly arise and how these impact the
elements the complainant must prove). For instance, patent infringement is
established by applying standard patent law found under Title 35 of the U.S. Code
and under Federal Circuit precedent.
30. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2); see Gary M. Hnath & James M. Gould, Litigating Trade
Secret Cases at the International Trade Commission, 19 AIPLA Q.J. 87, 101 (1991)
(enumerating certain factors the ITC has considered in determining whether the
domestic industry has been injured including foregone customers; decreasing sales;
declining production and profitability; the volume of imports; level of market
penetration by imports; and foreign capacity to increase exports).
31. Hnath, supra note 26, at 3.
32. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2) (making the law applicable only if an established
or developing industry existed in the United States).
33. Certain Variable Speed Wind Turbines & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337TA-376, USITC Pub. 3003, at 14, 17 (Nov. 1996) (Commission Determination and
Action) (elaborating that the economic prong questions whether an industry exists
or is being established, and the technical prong asks whether the industry actually
uses the proprietary information or product at issue); see also Jose M. Recio, A Change
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commercial activity in which the owner of the IP is engaged and
requires a demonstration that the owner has invested in the
manufacturing, or is engaged in engineering, researching, or
34
licensing the asserted patent.
The technical prong examines
35
whether the owner is actually exploiting the asserted IP.
B. TianRui and Developments at the ITC
Amsted Industries is an American manufacturer of cast steel railway
wheels and the developer of two secret manufacturing processes: the
36
ABC process and the Griffin process. At the time of the complaint,
Amsted no longer employed the ABC process at its foundries and
37
instead only licensed the process to several foundries in China.
TianRui is a Chinese manufacturer of cast steel railway wheels that
hired nine employees away from one of Amsted’s Chinese licensees,
Datong ABC Castings Company Limited, and thereby acquired the
38
ABC process.
The Datong employees were trained in the ABC
process and were notified that the process was confidential and
39
proprietary information.
Eventually, TianRui partnered with an
American company and began importing and marketing TianRui
40
wheels in the United States, becoming Amsted’s sole competitor.
On February 16, 2010, the ITC issued a ten-year limited exclusion
41
order against TianRui pursuant to section 337. TianRui appealed to
the Federal Circuit, asking that it consider whether the ITC’s
in Establishing the Domestic Industry Requirement at the International Trade Commission, 39
AIPLA Q.J. 131, 142 (2011) (explaining that the economic prong is more difficult to
show because it requires a minimum level of domestic economic activity and
contributions).
34. Certain Variable Speed Wind Turbines & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337TA-376, USITC Pub. 3003, at 14–15 (Nov. 1996) (Commission Determination and
Action).
35. Id. at 17–18.
36. TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
Specifically, eight of the nine employees signed confidentiality
agreements, but all nine were advised that they were under a duty not to disclose
confidential information. Id.
40. Id. at 1324–25.
41. Certain Cast Steel Ry. Wheels, Processes for Mfg. or Relating to Same &
Certain Prods. Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-665, USITC Pub. 4265, at 1–2 (Feb.
16, 2010) (Limited Exclusion Order). When the Commission finds a 337 violation,
the Commission decides whether to issue a general exclusion order or a limited
exclusion order. See Ralph A. Mittelberger & Gary M. Hnath, Changes in Section 337
as a Result of the GATT-Implementing Legislation, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 465, 471 (1994)
(explicating that a limited exclusion order directs the U.S. Customs Service to
exclude only those infringing products that came from the parties to the case, while
a general exclusion order directs the U.S. Customs Service to exclude all of the
goods found to violate section 337).
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authority under section 337 extended to conduct that occurred
entirely abroad, and whether an injury to a domestic industry can
exist where no domestic manufacturer is currently practicing the
42
secret process. The Federal Circuit answered in the affirmative on
43
both issues.
The court held that the statute applied extraterritorially, despite
the presumption, for three reasons. First, the nature of section 337
governs unfair acts in the “importation of articles,” which necessarily
44
involves an international transaction.
The focus is on the
prevention of entry based on conduct that occurred abroad—not the
45
regulation of the underlying conduct. Second, the exclusion order
does not purport to regulate purely foreign conduct because the
foreign conduct is only marginally relevant: it is merely a “predicate”
46
to the claim that TianRui committed unfair acts of competition.
Finally, the history of section 337 indicates that Congress intended a
broad and flexible meaning of “unfair methods of competition,”
47
including its application to conduct that occurred entirely abroad.
Regarding the domestic industry requirement of section 337, the
Federal Circuit explained that in instances of non-statutory IP, the
48
industry does not have to relate to the asserted process. The specific
provisions relating to statutory IP require that the industry relate to
49
the IP in question.
The court explained that the non-statutory
50
“general provision” has no such requirement.
42. TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1324.
43. Id. at 1337.
44. Id. at 1329 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that the statute
was akin to an immigration statute that bars entry of an alien for having engaged in
particular conduct in his home country).
45. The dissent rejected the majority’s immigration analogy. Id. at 1338 (Moore,
J., dissenting) (indicating that unlike the immigration scenario, the process by which
the wheels entered the U.S. and the presence of the wheels on U.S. soil, is lawful).
46. See id. at 1329–30 (majority opinion) (positing that the extraterritorial
conduct serves only to establish “an element of a claim alleging a domestic injury and
seeking a wholly domestic remedy”).
47. See U.S. TARIFF COMM’N, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1922) (advising Congress
that the new provisions “make it possible for the President to prevent unfair
practices, even when engaged in by individuals residing outside the jurisdiction of
the United States”).
48. TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1335. TianRui argued that the section 337 requirement
“that the acts of unfair competition threaten ‘to destroy or substantially injure an
industry in the United States’” cannot be met where the domestic industry does not
practice the misappropriated protected process.
Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. §
1337(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006)). TianRui explicated that the element necessitates the
existence of a domestic industry that is related to the asserted IP “in the same
manner that is required for statutory intellectual property.” Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. However, TianRui argued that the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1342, 102 Stat. 1107, 1212 (amending 19 U.S.C. §
1337), removed only the injury requirement for statutory IP and retained the general
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II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT REJECTED THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF A
DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
This Part criticizes the TianRui opinion on two grounds. First, the
majority did not follow Supreme Court precedent on the issue of
extraterritorial application of a statute in the absence of a clear grant
of authority from Congress. In effect, the Federal Circuit attempted
to discern congressional intent where it was not explicitly provided by
51
extending section 337 to misconduct that occurred entirely abroad.
Second, the Federal Circuit ignored ITC precedent regarding the
domestic industry requirement of section 337. There is strong case
law suggesting that a domestic industry does not exist where the
52
proprietary process at issue is not in use in the United States.
A. Allowing Extraterritorial Jurisdiction for Conduct that Occurred Entirely
Abroad Contradicts Supreme Court Precedent
The majority in TianRui discounted the Supreme Court’s clear
policy regarding extraterritoriality: “[w]hen a statute gives no clear
53
indication of extraterritorial application, it has none.” Section 337
does not explicitly authorize extraterritorial application, so it was
improper for the court to allow the Commission to prevent
importation of products borne from an infringement that occurred
entirely abroad.
Preliminarily, it may be argued that the statute was not applied
extraterritorially because the court only prevented TianRui from
importing products that used the misappropriated secret into the
54
United States —the court did not stop TianRui from selling its
products to consumers outside the United States. However, the court
ruled that conduct that occurred entirely abroad constituted an
55
unfair act of competition sufficient to invoke section 337. Thus, this
is an issue of extraterritoriality because Chinese companies were
requirement that the domestic industry relate to the IP (statutory or non-statutory)
asserted. TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1335–36.
51. TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1331–32 (concluding that Congress intended that the
Commission would consider conduct abroad).
52. See infra Part II.B (arguing that the Federal Circuit misapplied the domestic
industry requirement).
53. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010); see also EEOC
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 250–51 (1991) (stating that Congress’s intent as
to the extraterritorial application of a statute “must be deduced by inference from
boilerplate language” found in many other congressional acts), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077.
54. TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1329–30.
55. Id. at 1324.
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prevented from doing business with the United States for conduct
that occurred entirely within China.
Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates that the presumption
against extraterritoriality functions as an overarching paradigm and
56
canon of interpretation. The majority in TianRui relied in part on
57
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. for the proposition that the
Supreme Court allows “context [to] be consulted as well” and that
58
the presumption is not a “clear statement rule.” In fact, it is. In
Morrison, the Supreme Court reconsidered the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision attempting to discern
Congress’s extraterritorial intentions regarding Rule 10b-5 and
59
section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
The
Court concluded that section 10(b), and thus Rule 10b-5, does not
allow foreign plaintiffs to bring suit in the United States where the
60
securities at issue are traded entirely on a foreign exchange.
Despite language of the Exchange Act that appears to account for
the regulation of securities exchanges “operating in interstate and
61
foreign commerce,” the Court denied the extraterritorial application
62
of the statute. Section 30 of the Exchange Act provides that the
63
foreign location of the transaction renders the Act inapplicable. In
Morrison, all the relevant parties and securities were Australian,
rendering the transaction foreign and thus outside the scope of
64
section 10.
Had the Federal Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s logic in
Morrison, the presumption against extraterritoriality would have
survived. Section 337 lacks the “boiler-plate” language usually
65
present to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. The
Supreme Court has stipulated that it does not necessarily require an
56. See, e.g., Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (recalling that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is a “canon of construction” rather than a limitation on Congress’s
power to legislate (citing Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932))).
57. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
58. TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1329 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883).
59. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 168, 174 (2d Cir. 2008),
aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
60. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
61. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881, 881 (emphasis
added).
62. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883 (applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality).
63. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 30, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (2006).
64. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875–76, 2884 (noting that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is a “craven watchdog,” and it even applies notwithstanding the
involvement of some domestic activity).
65. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 250–51 (1991), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077.
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express statement of extraterritorial application and will consider
other factors such as a statutory language, structure, and
66
congressional intent. But the Federal Circuit attempted to “discern”
Congress’s intent in the same way that the Second Circuit did in
Morrison: by reasoning that importation necessitates extraterritorial
applicability and explaining that this type of argument is consistent
with Supreme Court precedent despite the Exchange Act’s “and
67
foreign commerce” language. The Morrison Court makes clear that
ambiguity in the language regarding a statute’s applicability overseas
68
will obviate its extraterritorial reach.
Importantly, Morrison provides significant language regarding the
presumption against extraterritoriality, which was ignored by the
Federal Circuit in TianRui. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
acknowledged that “it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial
application that lacks all contact with the territory of the United
69
States.”
Yet that is precisely what happened in TianRui—the
conduct at issue lacked all territorial contact with the United States
because the unfair acts and misappropriation took place entirely
70
within China.
71
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. explains that where a statute
provides for some extraterritorial application, the presumption limits
72
its applicability to those limited terms.
Microsoft involved the
applicability of section 271(f)(1) of the Patent Act to acts amounting
73
to patent infringement occurring entirely abroad. Section 271(f)(1)
provides that infringement occurs when someone in the United
States supplies the uncombined components of a patent to actively
induce its combination abroad, such that the act would have
constituted a patent infringement had it occurred in the United
66. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993) (relying on
statutory structure, language, and legislative history to conclude that the statute at
issue applies in only one instance).
67. TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
68. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878.
69. Id. at 2884; see also Appellants’ Reply Brief on Appeal at 11, TianRui, 661 F.3d
1322 (No. 2010-1395) (interpreting this to suggest that minor and lawful acts that
occur domestically will not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality).
70. TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1324; see Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885 (offering that
foreign countries also regulate their securities exchanges and have their own
determinations as to what constitutes fraud, necessary disclosures, available discovery,
and joinder provisions in their court rules).
71. 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
72. Id. at 457–58.
73. See id. at 441–42 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2006)) (noting that AT&T had
a patent on a computer that digitally recorded and compressed speech and that
Microsoft’s Windows software is capable of infringing on this patent when loaded
onto a computer).
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74

States. Therefore, section 271(f)(1) operates as an exception to the
general presumption in patent law that “no infringement occurs
75
when a patented product is made and sold in another country.” At
issue in Microsoft was whether Microsoft’s act of transmitting a master
76
copy of Windows software abroad, which was then copied abroad
and loaded onto computers made and sold abroad, amounted to
77
78
infringement. The Court concluded that it did not.
The Supreme Court explained that the presumption was still
relevant even where the statute provided for some extraterritorial
79
applicability.
In contrast, the Federal Circuit explained that
extraterritorial jurisdiction over non-statutory IP is not limited by
statute and expanded the statute’s reach to include wholly
74. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1).
75. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 441.
76. Software is defined as the “set of instructions, known as code, that directs a
computer to perform specified functions or operations.” Fantasy Sports Props., Inc.
v. SportsLine.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
77. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 441–42.
78. See id. at 449–52. The Court explained that there were two major issues
involved in the case. First, the Court addressed the issue of whether software
qualifies as a component for the purposes of section 271(f). Id. More specifically,
the issue was whether “software in the abstract” can constitute a component. Id. at
448. The Court explained that it could not because software detached from its
medium is not capable of being combined—only copies of it are combinable. Id. at
449. The second issue, relying on the first, was whether the components at issue
were supplied from the United States. Id. at 452. Because only the copies of the
software constituted components, and these copies were made abroad, section 271(f)
was inapplicable. Id. at 454.
79. See id. at 455–56 (elaborating that in these circumstances the presumption
operated as an “instructive” tool in determining the extent of a statute’s
extraterritorial reach); see also Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518,
531 (1972) (providing that patent legislation was not intended to operate beyond the
bounds of the United States, and, as foreign patent legislation has no control over
the United States markets, American patent legislation has no applicability abroad),
superseded by statute, Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat.
3383. But see Timothy A. Cook, Courts as Diplomats: Encouraging an International Patent
Enforcement Treaty Through Extraterritorial Constructions of the Patent Act, 97 VA. L. REV.
1181, 1189 (2011) (noting that twelve years after Deepsouth, Congress responded to
the Supreme Court’s decision by passing the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984,
which declared that acts completed outside the United States would constitute
infringement if they were prompted by “contributory activity” within the United
States). Some argue that Congress’s past reactions to a rigid application of the antiextraterritoriality canon should be indicative of a more lenient congressional intent
to allow the extraterritorial application of statutes. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt.
2, at 1 (1991) (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was intended to overturn a
number of Supreme Court Civil Rights cases); Cook, supra, at 1189–90 (noting that
the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984 was intended to overturn DeepSouth);
Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was it Effective,
Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195, 199 (2011) (stating that Dodd-Frank
Act section 929P(b) was a response to Morrison); see also George T. Conway III,
Extraterritoriality After Dodd-Frank, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Aug. 5, 2010, 8:58 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/08/05/extraterritoriality-after-doddfrank/.
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80

extraterritorial conduct. Even if the Federal Circuit could find some
grant of extraterritorial applicability in section 337 to trade secret
violations, however, the language of the statute should have limited
its applicability to those terms, not expanded it based on statutory
silence.
Ultimately, the absence of a congressional grant of
extraterritorial jurisdiction in section 337 cases involving nonstatutory IP (such as trade secrets) should have caused the Federal
Circuit to uphold the presumption against extraterritoriality.
B. Misapplication of the Domestic Industry Requirement
The Federal Circuit’s explication of the domestic industry
requirement expanded the scope of section 337 by finding that
misappropriation of a trade secret that was no longer in use
81
threatened to substantially injure a domestic industry. The court
explained that there was no express requirement in section 337
regarding non-statutory IP that necessitated the IP at issue to relate to
the domestic industry—that is, it was irrelevant that Amsted
82
Industries no longer used the proprietary process. This conclusion
is inapposite to prior ITC determinations, which have implied that
absent a showing that the misappropriation barred the complainant
from either entering into the industry or developing a competitive
product, the complainant must show that the trade secret was in use
83
at the time of the complaint.
80. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2119, 2127–28 (2008) (bifurcating the interpretation of the extraterritorial
reach of U.S. patents into two views: a strict view, as adopted by the Supreme Court,
and an “effects-based” test, adopted by some courts and commentators). In essence,
the Federal Circuit applied an approach that mimics the “effects-based test” adopted
by some courts and commentators by allowing the trade secret to cover acts that
occurred outside the United States based entirely on its effect on the U.S. market.
See id. at 2154 (permitting any act that effects the U.S. market, albeit abroad, to serve
as a basis for jurisdiction).
81. TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
82. The decision was based largely on the administrative law judge’s finding that
it was unnecessary for the domestic industry to actually use the process and instead, it
was sufficient to show that the misappropriation of the process injured the
complainant’s domestic industry. Id. at 1326.
83. The history of section 337 provides further support for this proposition.
Before 1988, plaintiffs in section 337 cases had to prove either that the defendants’
acts threatened to destroy or substantially injure an existing domestic industry that
was “economically and efficiently operated,” or that the alleged unfair acts prevented
the establishment of such an industry. See, e.g., Certain Roller Units, Inv. No. 337-TA044, USITC Pub. 944, at 2 (Feb. 1979) (Memorandum Opinion); S. Alex Lasher, The
Evolution of the Domestic Industry Requirement in Section 337 Investigations Before the United
States International Trade Commission, 18 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 157, 167 (2010)
(maintaining that Congress believed the “elimination of the ‘economically and
efficiently operated’ requirement would” make section 337 more accessible to
plaintiffs by lowering the costs of litigation). But see Antoinette M. von dem Hagen,
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As explained by the majority in TianRui, the Omnibus Trade and
84
85
Competitiveness Act of 1988 strengthened section 337. The act
altered the domestic industry requirement for statutory IP by
enumerating specific criteria to determine the existence of a
domestic industry but did not change the domestic industry and
86
injury requirements for non-statutory IP. In those cases, the ITC has
consistently applied its precedent to determine whether the domestic
87
industry requirement is satisfied.
As a preliminary matter, a complainant in a section 337 case must
88
establish the existence of a domestic industry. Prior ITC decisions
explain that the domestic industry requirement is judged based on
the “production-related activities that exploit the intellectual
89
property rights in issue.” The scope of the industry is therefore
90
limited to the products manufactured in the United States, and
“section 337 protects domestic industries, not importers or
91
inventors.”
In trade secret misappropriation cases arising under
section 337, the domestic industry constitutes “that portion of
complainant’s domestic operations devoted to utilization of the
confidential and proprietary technology at issue which is the target of
92
the unfair acts or practices.”
As such, to prove one part of the domestic industry requirement in
a trade secret case, one must demonstrate that resources were
Note, Trade-Based Remedies for Copyright Infringement: Utilizing a “Loss Preventative”
Synthesis, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 99, 136 (1989) (articulating that the phrase
“economically and efficiently operated” was never defined and was never grounds for
denying relief for lack of a showing).
84. Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1342, 102 Stat. 1107, 1212 (1988).
85. See TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1335–36 (explaining that the separate requirements
for statutory IP enumerated in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act merely
indicated that the injury requirement was no longer an element to be proven in the
case of statutory IP).
86. Gary M. Hnath & James M. Gould, Litigating Trade Secret Cases at the
International Trade Commission, 19 AIPLA Q.J. 87, 95 (1991).
87. See id. at 96 (elaborating that disputes over the definition of a domestic
industry usually arise in cases involving multiple asserted trade secrets).
88. See infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text (illustrating the domestic
industry requirement).
89. Certain Elec. Power Tools, Battery Cartridges, & Battery Chargers, Inv. No.
337-TA-284, USITC Pub. 2389, at 238 (June 1991) (Commission Determination and
Action).
90. Id. at 239.
91. See id. at 243 (explaining that “[p]roduction-related activities distinguish a
domestic industry from an importer or inventor” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citation omitted)); see also Mittelberger & Hnath, supra note 41, at 468 (providing
that section 337 originally was intended to provide a remedy against cartels, not as a
means of protecting IP).
92. Certain Processes for the Manufacture of Skinless Sausage Casings &
Resultant Prod., Inv. No. 337-TA-148/169, USITC Pub. 1624, at 341 (Dec. 1984)
(Commission Determination and Action).
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93

devoted domestically to the use of the trade secret. The Floppy Disk
94
95
Drives case, cited to by the majority in TianRui, never resolved the
issue of whether unfair acts that compromise the confidentiality of
trade secret information can nevertheless satisfy the domestic
96
industry requirement. Thus, the case should not have conclusively
supported the court’s assertion that domestic use of the trade secret
was unnecessary to finding the existence of a domestic industry.
As in TianRui, the complainant in Floppy Disk Drives admitted that
none of its facilities was exploiting the trade secrets at issue, and none
97
of its disk drives was using the trade secrets.
Unlike TianRui,
however, the complainant alleged that it did not pursue a design that
involved the trade secret because, by that time, respondents had
already stolen or destroyed most of the drawings relating to the trade
98
secret design. The complainant further alleged that, but for the
respondents’ unfair acts, the complainant would have developed a
99
disk drive using the trade secret.
The administrative law judge
explained that a determination on these facts involved considering
additional “substantial factual issues and complicated legal
100
questions,” which were never ultimately addressed by the ITC
101
Unlike the
because the case was dismissed on other grounds.
discussion in Floppy Disk Drives, Amsted was not blocked from
exploiting the ABC process as a result of TianRui’s unfair acts, and its
decision to discontinue use of the ABC process had nothing to do
102
with the alleged misappropriation thereof.
These facts are thus
distinguishable from Floppy Disk Drives and illustrate an alternative
issue that went unaddressed by the Federal Circuit.
93. See Mittelberger & Hnath, supra note 41, at 488 (stating that a complaint must
prove “that a domestic industry exists or is in the process of being established in
connection with the infringed intellectual property right”).
94. Certain Floppy Disk Drives & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-203,
USITC Pub. 1756, at 44–45 (Sept. 1985) (Initial Determination).
95. TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
96. See Certain Floppy Disk Drives & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-203,
USITC Pub. 1756, at 48, 80 (Sept. 1985) (Initial Determination) (denying summary
determination on the issue of whether the domestic industry was economically and
efficiently operated but granting summary determination on the issue of injury to a
domestic industry and refusing to find a section 337 violation).
97. Id. at 43.
98. Id. at 45.
99. Id. at 33.
100. Id. at 48.
101. Id. at 80 (granting summary determination on the issues of importation and
substantial injury).
102. TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (retiring the ABC process at its Alabama foundries in exchange for use of the
Griffin process).
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The Federal Circuit did not address the issue of whether a
company in a section 337 trade secret case can prove the existence of
103
a domestic industry solely through overseas licensing activities. The
answer is likely yes, with some evaluation of the economic nature of
104
the activities.
Although Amsted may not have engaged in
production-related activities, it was certainly “exploiting” its trade
105
secret by licensing it to foreign manufacturers.
In many ways, a
company such as Amsted that owns a trade secret, but is not using it,
106
is very similar to the “non-practicing entity” (NPE) in patent law.
107
Although the term carries derogatory connotations, the NPE owns a
108
Instead, it
patent but does not use it for production purposes.
licenses the proprietary information or process to another party and
109
litigates claims against those who infringe on the IP.
The domestic industry requirement in cases involving NPEs
110
similarly involves proof of the economic and technical prongs, but
it allows for the possibility of a lesser showing of economic activity
depending on the type of licensing frequency and economic
111
investment.
The ITC has established that, where continual patent
licensing activity and technical support for the IP exist, the domestic

103. See id. at 1337 (supporting its holding on the existence of a domestic industry
rather than infringement of overseas licensing opportunities).
104. See Certain Stringed Musical Instruments & Components Thereof, Inv. No.
337-TA-586, USITC Pub. 4120, at 23–24 (Dec. 2009) (Initial Determination)
(denying relief by evaluating the nature, and not merely the quantity, of the
economic activity); see also Recio, supra note 33, at 146 (elaborating that the ITC may
be willing to find the existence of a domestic industry on a substantially lower
showing of economic activity but will also take into account the nature of that
activity).
105. See Pablo M. Bentes et al., International Trade, 45 INT’L LAW. 79, 91 (2011)
(regarding the domestic industry requirement, section 337 complainants are
increasingly relying on a general showing of exploitation of the IP, rather than
production expenditures, which has likely been a result of the United States’s shift
from a manufacturing-based economy to an information-based economy).
106. See Recio, supra note 33, at 143–44 (defining NPEs as non-manufacturing but
license-holding legal entities in patent infringement cases).
107. See Robert Wagner, Federal Circuit Sanctions Non-Practicing Entity for Baseless
Lawsuit—Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, PIT IP TECH BLOG (Aug. 2, 2011),
http://pitiptechblog.com/2011/08/02/federal-circuit-sanctions-non-practicingentity-for-baseless-lawsuit-eon-net-lp-v-flagstar-bancorp/ (illustrating that NPEs often
buy patents with the sole purpose of bringing meritless claims to force settlements in
cases that are notoriously expensive to litigate).
108. See Recio, supra note 33, at 143–44 (explaining that NPEs hold licenses to
numerous patents which they then license and enforce against infringement).
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text (explaining the two prongs of
the domestic industry requirement).
111. Certain Variable Speed Wind Turbines & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337TA-376, USITC Pub. 3003, at 14–15 (Nov. 1996) (Commission Determination and
Action).
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112

industry requirement will likely be satisfied.
Continual licensing
and technical support together demonstrate investment in labor,
113
research and development, and engineering of the asserted IP.
The ITC has yet to determine whether, in the extreme case where the
NPE engages purely in licensing activity, the domestic industry
114
requirement is satisfied.
Arguably, Amsted is closely related to the patent cases involving
continual licensing and technical support. The issue still remains,
however, whether the complete lack of a domestic connection to the
ABC process bars a finding that a domestic industry exists. Certainly,
it complicates finding a “substantial injury” where the only injury to
Amsted would be that it now has competition from a foreign
manufacturer when it previously enjoyed a monopoly on the
production of cast steel railway wheels. Ultimately, the Federal
Circuit incorrectly based its conclusion in TianRui on the distinction
between statutory and non-statutory IP and missed the opportunity to
answer an unresolved question in section 337 jurisprudence
regarding licensing activity and the domestic industry requirement in
cases involving trade secret misappropriation.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit inappropriately expanded the scope of section
337 to include an unfair act of misappropriation of a trade secret that
was no longer in use by the complainant that occurred entirely
abroad. The Supreme Court has expounded a clear stance on the
112. Id. at 69. The ITC will allow a substantially lesser showing of economic
activity where the NPE made nominal capital investments in attempting to bring a
product to market. Certain Audible Devices for Divers, Inv. No. 337-TA-365, USITC
Pub. 2903, at 45–46 (Aug. 1995) (Initial Determination).
113. But see Certain Stringed Musical Instruments & Components Thereof, Inv.
No. 337-TA-586, USITC Pub. 4120, at 23–24 (Dec. 2009) (Initial Determination)
(barring relief where the complainant merely established that he spent $8500 to
make product prototypes and that he partook in several unsuccessful pre-suit
licensing discussions).
114. See Complaint, Certain Elec. Devices, Including Handheld Wireless
Commc’ns Devices, Inv. No. 337-TA-667/673 (Dec. 2008). Here, the ITC had the
opportunity to determine whether a holder of 180 patents, and a licensor of three,
satisfied the domestic industry requirement as a result of patent litigation expenses it
incurred. Id. ¶¶ 95–96. The parties settled before a final determination could be
made, Certain Elec. Devices, Including Handheld Wireless Commn’cs Devices, Inv.
No. 337-TA-667/673, at 1–3 (Feb. 12, 2010) (Initial Determination) (granting a joint
motion to terminate the investigation on the basis of a settlement agreement), but
some argue that this type of activity was not the type Congress intended to protect
through the amendments to section 337, see COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, TRADE AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM ACT OF 1987, H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 1, at
156–58 (1987) (declaring that licensing activity in section 337 should not be used as
a loophole to filing suit).
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extraterritorial application of statutes: no jurisdiction exists over acts
that occurred entirely abroad without a clear grant from Congress.
By attempting to discern congressional intent from a statute that
lacked explicit boilerplate language indicating extraterritorial
application, the Federal Circuit did exactly what the Supreme Court
had previously chastised. Furthermore, the amendments to section
337 demonstrate that, despite the changes to the domestic industry
requirement in statutory IP cases, the requirement that a domestic
industry be present in non-statutory IP cases has not changed and
continues to rely on ITC precedent. Under these circumstances, the
Federal Circuit incorrectly found that a domestic industry existed
despite the lack of production-related activities. TianRui did not
impede Amsted from entering or creating a domestic industry of cast
steel railway wheels but was merely competing with the American
manufacturer of like products who was otherwise alone in the
American cast steel railway wheel market.

